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Abstract. Boolean games (BGs) are a strategic framework in which
agents’ goals are described using propositional logic. Despite the
popularity of BGs, the problem of how agents can coordinate with
others to (at least partially) achieve their goals has hardly received
any attention. However, negotiation protocols that have been devel-
oped outside the setting of BGs can be adopted for this purpose,
provided that we can formalize (i) how agents can make commit-
ments and (ii) how deals between coalitions of agents can be iden-
tiﬁed given a set of active commitments. In this paper, we focus on
these two aims. First, we show how agents can formulate commit-
ments that are in accordance with their goals, and what it means for
the commitments of an agent to be consistent. Second, we formalize
deals in terms of coalitions who can achieve their goals without help
from others. We show that verifying the consistency of a set of com-
mitments of one agent is ΠP2 -complete while checking the existence
of a deal in a set of mutual commitments is ΣP2 -complete. Finally,
we illustrate how the introduced concepts of commitments and deals
can be used to achieve game-theoretical properties of the deals and
to conﬁgure negotiation protocols.
1 Introduction
Boolean games (BGs) are a game-theoretic framework which uses
propositional logic to represent the goals of agents in a compact
way [24]. A key feature of BGs is that each agent controls the truth
value of a subset of the atoms from which these goals are built; these
atoms are referred to as the action variables of the agent. In standard
BGs, goals are of a binary nature [24]. In the context of negotia-
tion, however, it is usually more natural to consider prioritized goal
bases [6, 14], as these allow agents to partially concede. The basic
intuition underlying BGs is illustrated in the next example.
Example 1
Suppose there are four agents, denoted by 1, 2, 3 and 4, representing
four nations. Each agent i controls an action variable di. If agent i
sets its action variable di to true, this means that i will disarm its
nation. Nation 1 considers nation 2 a threat, nation 3 an ally and
nation 4 irrelevant for its military strategy. It believes to be safe if
either nation 2 disarms or nations 1 and 3 both keep their arms, i.e.
d2∨(¬d1∧¬d3). Nation 2 considers nation 1 as the only real threat,
but prefers to disarm itself due to the associated costs of maintaining
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its arms. Therefore, its highest priority goal is d1 ∧ d2. Nation 3
strongly believes in the possibility of an alien invasion and prefers
all nations to be armed, i.e. its highest priority goal is ¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧
¬d3 ∧¬d4. The paciﬁstic nation 4’s ﬁrst priority is the disarmament
of all nations, i.e. d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3 ∧ d4.
Although Boolean games have been widely studied in recent years,
leading among others to the characterization of numerous solution
concepts, the literature on BGs provides surprisingly few tools for
agents to actually coordinate towards mutually beneﬁcial agreements
(see Section 5). The broader literature on multi-agent systems, how-
ever, has provided numerous negotiation protocols [34, 26, 3, 18, 33].
From a high-level point of view, many of these protocols are based on
agents formulating commitments, intuitively encoding what they are
prepared to offer in return for their goals being (partially) fulﬁlled.
After a number of rounds, in which agents may progressively weaken
their stance, the agents may end up with a set of mutual commitments
which are such that a deal can be made. There are many technical de-
tails that need to be speciﬁed as part of a negotiation protocol (related
e.g. to how agents communicate), but most of these are not depen-
dent on how the agent’s goals are encoded. In particular, to adapt
existing negotiation protocols to the BG setting, it sufﬁces to specify
how agents can formulate commitments (i.e. proposal submission)
and how deals based on these commitments can be made (i.e. agree-
ment formation). The incorporation of the introduced notions into
existing protocols is illustrated in Section 4.3.
Central to the discussion in this paper is the notion of a com-
mitment. In the literature, a commitment is commonly stated as
(i; j; ante; con), with the interpretation that agent i commits to
agent j to bring about con when ante is made true by the other
agents [37]. For instance, in the context of Example 1, a sensible
commitment for agent 2 would be (2; 1; d1; d2): if agent 1 disarms,
agent 2 is prepared to do this as well. Commitments provide an intu-
itive way to formulate a propositional proposal and at the same time
capture the fact that particular action variables are controlled by par-
ticular agents. This makes commitments a natural ﬁt for the frame-
work of BGs. Moreover, by identifying creditors, a commitment-
based protocol allows the formation of deals between a subset of
agents, i.e. the formation of coalitions. For instance, suppose in
Example 1 that agent 1 and 2 respectively formulate the commit-
ments (1; 2; d2;) and (2; 1; d1; d2), where the former communi-
cates agent 1’s willingness to play any strategy if agent 2 disarms.
Note such a commitment merely informs agent 2 of possibilities, but
yields no guarantees, since  is brought about by default. The com-
mitments of agents 1 and 2 lead to a possible deal: they can form a
coalition {1, 2} and play {d1, d2}, i.e. both nations disarm. To con-
ﬁrm the deal, however, agent 1 has to make a stronger commitment,
i.e. it must speciﬁcally commit to bring about d1 if d2 is brought
about. If this deal between agents 1 and 2 is closed, the BG can be re-
duced, allowing the remaining agents to update their goals: agent 3’s
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highest priority goal is no longer achievable and it should now turn
to its lower priority goals. Agent 4’s highest priority goal is reduced
to d3 ∧ d4, i.e. in order to disarm all nations it remains to disarm it-
self and convince agent 3 to disarm as well. Note that by identifying
deals between coalitions of agents, a global consensus is not required
to obtain local deals. Moreover, the reduction of the BG induced by
the previous deals facilitates matters for the agents that were not yet
able to close a deal. These advantages are especially important in
large-scale games, which many real-life applications are.
An important requirement for commitments is that agents should
be able to guarantee that they can fulﬁll them. For instance, sup-
pose that agent 1 in Example 1 communicates the commitments
(1; 2; d2; d1) and (1; 3;¬d3;¬d1). Clearly, in case agent 2 and 3
play {d2,¬d3}, the agent cannot play a strategy such that all its com-
mitments are fulﬁlled. In Section 3 we formalize a notion of consis-
tency, which captures the intuition that agents should not make com-
mitments that cannot be jointly fulﬁlled. As we will show, checking
whether a given set of commitments is consistent is a ΠP2 -complete
problem.
Given a set of commitments, the main inference task we consider
is verifying whether any corresponding deals can be made. Some of
the issues underlying this process are illustrated in the next example.
Example 2
Suppose the agents in Example 1 communicate the following com-
mitments:
(1; 2; d2;) (3; {1, 2, 4};¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d4;¬d3)
(1; 3;¬d3;¬d1) (4; {1, 2, 3}; d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3; d4)
(2; 1; d1; d2)
Intuitively, the commitments agents 1 and 2 make to each other al-
low a deal between them to both disarm: {d1, d2}. However, as stated
earlier, agent 1 has not speciﬁcally committed to bring about d1 when
d2 is brought about. Therefore, we cannot consider this a conﬁrmed
deal. Moreover, agent 1’s commitment to agent 3 blocks the possible
deal with 2 when agent 3 decides to play ¬d3. As a result, agents 1
and 2 cannot form a coalition by themselves based on the current
set of commitments, as they would be reliant on what agent 3 subse-
quently decides.
Note that to identify deals, the control assignment of the BG should
be taken into account, i.e. it does not sufﬁce to check the satisﬁabil-
ity of conjunctions of formulas corresponding to goals of coalitions.
Suppose, for instance, that agents 1 and 2 want agent 3 to disarm,
i.e. the conjunction of their highest priority goal is satisﬁed if d3
holds. Then no deal can be reached unless agent 3 can be convinced
to set d3 to true. As we will show, as a result, the problem of check-
ing whether a deal can be made given a set of commitments is ΣP2 -
complete. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to study
commitment-based deals in BGs.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we give some background
on BGs in Section 2. In Section 3 we formalize commitments in BGs,
deﬁning important concepts, including the consistency of a set of
commitments, which guarantees that agents can honour their com-
mitments, irrespective of the strategies of the other agents. After in-
vestigating the computational complexity of verifying consistency in
Section 3.1, we explain how an agent can formulate commitments
that accord with a single goal or with a prioritized goal base in re-
spectively Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Then we formalize how agents can
identify deals based on a set of commitments and investigate the
computational complexity in Section 4.1. Next, we illustrate how our
concepts can be used to guarantee game-theoretical properties of the
deals in Section 4.2 and how they can be implemented in existing
protocols in Section 4.3. We discuss related work in Section 5 and
present our conclusion and interesting questions for further research
in Section 6. The proofs of all results are available in an online ap-
pendix6.
2 Preliminaries
The propositional language LΦ is built from a ﬁnite set of atoms Φ
in the usual way. We write Lit(Φ) = Φ ∪ {¬p | p ∈ Φ}. An inter-
pretation of Φ is deﬁned as a subset ν of Lit(Φ) such that for every
atom p ∈ Φ either p ∈ ν or ¬p ∈ ν. We denote the set of all inter-
pretations of Φ as Int(Φ). An interpretation can be extended to LΦ
in the usual way. We write ν |= ϕ to denote that formula ϕ is true
in interpretation ν. Whenever we write an interpretation ν where a
formula is expected, this should be interpreted as the conjunction of
ν’s literals. For two formulas ϕ and ψ ∈ LΦ, it holds that ϕ entails
ψ, denoted ϕ |= ψ, iff for every interpretation ν it holds that ν |= ψ
whenever ν |= ϕ. We say that a variable p is irrelevant in a formula
if there exists an equivalent formula in which p does not occur [30].
The relevant variables of a formula γ are denoted as DepVar(γ). We
say that ϕ and ψ are equivalent modulo δ, denoted ϕ ≡ ψ(mod δ),
iff ϕ∧ δ is equivalent with ψ∧ δ [30]. We use the variant of Boolean
games from [14].
Deﬁnition 1 (Boolean Game with Priorities)
A Boolean game (BG) with priorities is a tuple G = (N, (Φi)i∈N ,
(δi)i∈N , (Γi)i∈N ), where N is a ﬁnite set of agents, Φi is a ﬁnite set
of atoms such that Φi ∩ Φj = ∅ for j 
= i, δi is a consistent formula
in LΦi , and Γi = {γ1i ; . . . ; γpi } is i’s prioritized goal base. We write
Φ =
⋃
i∈N Φi and δ =
∧
i∈N δi. The formula γ
m
i ∈ LΦ is agent i’s
goal of prioritym. We assume w.l.o.g. that every agent has p priority
levels.
Deﬁnition 1 is a particular case of generalized BGs [6] in which
the preference relations are total, but with the addition of con-
straints δi [8]. The set Φ contains all action variables (or atoms).
Agent i controls the truth value of the atoms in Φi, with the restric-
tion that δi must be satisﬁed. We write Si = {νi ∈ Int(Φi) | νi |=
δi} for the set of permissible strategies of agent i. A non-empty sub-
set ofN is called a coalition. We straightforwardly extend deﬁnitions
w.r.t. agents to coalitions, e.g. ΦJ is the set of action variables con-
trolled by a coalition J , SJ denotes the permissible joint strategies.
We denote singleton coalitions {i} as i when there can be no con-
fusion. By convention, goals are ordered from high (level 1) to low
priority (level p).
Example 1 (Continued)
We have N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Φi = {di} and δi =  for each i ∈ N .
Consequently, Si = {di,¬di}, i.e. each agent can either disarm or
not. The prioritized goal bases in the BG are:
Γ1 = {d2 ∨ (¬d1 ∧ ¬d3);¬d1},Γ2 = {d1 ∧ d2;¬d2}
Γ3 = {¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d3 ∧ ¬d4; (¬d1 ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d4) ∧ ¬d3}
Γ4 = {d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3 ∧ d4; d4}
This means, e.g. for agent 2, that its ﬁrst priority is for agents 1 and 2
to disarm and its second priority is to arm.
We now deﬁne the concept of relevant agents for a formula, which is
related to the concept of relevant agents for another agent described
in [7].
6 http://www.cwi.ugent.be/soﬁe/ECAI16appendix.pdf
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Deﬁnition 2 (Relevant Agents for a Formula)
The set of relevant agents RelAg(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ LΦ is deﬁned as
⋃
i∈N
{( ⋂
ψ≡ϕ(mod δ)
DepVar(ψ)
)
∩ Φi 
= ∅
}
In other words, the relevant agents for a formula are the agents con-
trolling its relevant variables, taking into account the constraint δ. For
instance, in Example 1, the relevant agents for (d1∧d2)∧(¬d3∨d3)
are {1, 2}.
Deﬁnition 3 (Outcome)
An interpretation of Φ satisfying δ is called an outcome of G. We
denote the set of all outcomes as SN .
An outcome ν corresponds to a tuple (ν1, . . . , νn) with νi ∈ Si for
every i ∈ N . We write νJ = ν ∩ Lit(ΦJ) for the restriction of ν
to the strategies of agents in coalition J . The restriction of ν to the
agents outside J is denoted as ν−J . For disjoint coalitions J and J ′,
ν ∈ SJ and ν′ ∈ SJ′ , we write (ν, ν′) ∈ SJ∪J′ to denote their joint
strategy. We also use the notation (ν, ν′) if J and J ′ are not disjoint,
but νi = ν′i for every i ∈ J ∩ J ′. For the ease of presentation, we
deﬁne a numerical utility in [0, 1], which is determined by the highest
priority for which the corresponding goal is satisﬁed by ν.
Deﬁnition 4 (Utility Function)
Let G be a BG. For each i ∈ N and ν ∈ SN , the utility of i in ν is
deﬁned as:
ui(G, ν) =
p+ 1−min{k | 1 ≤ k ≤ p, ν |= γki }
p
with min ∅ = p+ 1.
Note that if ν does not satisfy any goal, the utility is 0, while it is 1
iff the ﬁrst priority goal is satisﬁed. In Example 1, for instance, the
utility of agent 1 is 1 for every outcome ν in which the coalition
{1, 3} plays the joint strategy {¬d1,¬d3}, i.e. if both nations 1 and 3
decide against disarmament. Note that there exist alternative ways
to extract utilities from prioritized goal bases [6], for which similar
results as the ones presented in this paper can be obtained.
A well-known solution concept in BGs is the pure Nash equilib-
rium. This notion is based on best responses: we say that ν ∈ Si
is a best response to ν∗ ∈ S−i, written BR(G, ν, ν∗), iff for every
ν′ ∈ Si it holds that ui(G, (ν, ν∗)) ≥ ui(G, (ν′, ν∗)). Intuitively,
this means that given the strategies of the other agents, an agent is not
better off by deviating from its current strategy. In Example 1, for in-
stance, agent 2’s ﬁrst priority is the disarmament of agents 1 and 2.
Therefore, if agent 1 disarms, agent 2’s best response is to disarm as
well.
Deﬁnition 5 (Pure Nash Equilibrium)
An outcome ν is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the BG G iff
BR(G, νi, ν−i) holds for every i ∈ N .
In Example 1, for instance, the outcomes {d1, d2,¬d3, d4} and
{¬d1,¬d2,¬d3, d4} are PNEs.
3 Formalizing Commitments in BGs
In this section, we adapt the notion of commitment from [37] to the
context of BGs. Among others, we analyze how agents can formal-
ize consistent commitments based on the goal they want to achieve.
Throughout this section, we will assume that G = (N, (Φi)i∈N ,
(δi)i∈N , (Γi)i∈N ) is a BG.
Deﬁnition 6 (Commitment in BG)
The tuple c = (deb(c); cred(c); ante(c); con(c)) is called a com-
mitment in G if deb(c) ∈ N , cred(c) ⊆ N \ {deb(c)}, ante(c) is
a formula such that RelAg(ante(c)) = cred(c), ante(c) ∧ δ 
|= ⊥,
con(c) is a formula containing only variables from Φdeb(c), and
con(c) ∧ δ 
|= ⊥.
Intuitively, a commitment c describes a state of affairs in which
the debtor deb(c) commits to the creditors7 cred(c) to bring about
the consequent con(c) if the antecedent ante(c) is satisﬁed. To ex-
clude meaningless commitments, we assume that con(c) contains
only variables from Φdeb(c), i.e. we do not allow an agent to com-
mit to anything outside its own control. Moreover, we assume that
con(c) is consistent with δdeb(c), meaning that there exists at least
one strategy ν ∈ Sdeb(c) such that ν |= con(c). This restriction,
which excludes impossible promises, corresponds to the consistency
postulate for active commitments in [37]. We also exclude the debtor
as one of its own creditors, as the commitment is meaningless to the
other creditors if the debtor itself can control whether or not the an-
tecedent is fulﬁlled. The condition RelAg(ante(c)) = cred(c) makes
the formulation of other deﬁnitions more convenient, but is not an
explicit requirement for commitments [37]. We demand that ante(c)
is satisﬁable w.r.t. δ, in line with the nonvacuity postulate for active
commitments [37].
If ante(c) ≡  (and thus cred(c) = ∅), the commitment is called
unconditional. The case where con(c) ≡  contradicts the ﬁrst pos-
tulate in [37], which says that a commitment is discharged (no longer
active) when the consequent holds. This makes sense, since such a
commitment makes no guarantees to the creditor. However, as illus-
trated in Section 1, we will use such commitments to allow an agent
to express that it is prepared to bring about any of its strategies when
the antecedent is satisﬁed. This will be useful in our formalization
of a possible deal, as will become clear in Deﬁnition 12. To obtain a
conﬁrmed deal though, the agent will have to make a stronger com-
mitment, as will become clear in Deﬁnition 14.
In the following example and throughout this paper, subscripts are
used to indicate the controlling agent of each action variable.
Example 3
In the context of Example 1, consider the pair of commitments
(1; 2; d2; d1) and (1; 3;¬d3;¬d1). In the ﬁrst commitment, agent 1
commits to disarm, i.e. bring about d1, when agent 2 disarms, i.e.
brings about d2. In the second commitment, agent 1 commits to arm,
i.e. bring about ¬d1, when agent 3 arms, i.e. brings about ¬d3.
Note that the commitments in Example 3 cannot be fulﬁlled simulta-
neously. We will call such commitments inconsistent and formalize
the concept of consistent commitments in the following section.
3.1 Consistency of Commitments
Given that commitments are meant to be binding, it is important that
an agent can jointly fulﬁl the set of all commitments it has made.
To formalize this notion of consistency, we introduce the following
abbreviations:
deb(C) =
⋃
c∈C
deb(c), cred(C) =
⋃
c∈C
cred(c),
ante(C) =
∧
c∈C
ante(c), con(C) =
∧
c∈C
con(c).
7 In contrast to [37], we allow multiple creditors.
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Deﬁnition 7 (Consistent Commitments)
Suppose C is a set of commitments of agent i, i.e. deb(C) = i. Then
C is consistent iff for every non-empty subset C′ of C:
(ante(C′) ∧ δ) is consistent ⇒ (con(C′) ∧ δ) is consistent
Intuitively, whenever there exists a strategy of the creditors of a sub-
set C′ of C that satisﬁes the antecedents in C′, there should exist a
strategy of the debtor of C′ that satisﬁes all consequents in C′. Note
that it is not sufﬁcient for consistency that every pair of commitments
in the set C is consistent, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 4
Every pair in the following set of commitments is consistent, but
the three commitments together are not: (1; 2; d2; d1 ↔ ¬b1),
(1; 3; d3; b1 ↔ ¬c1), (1; 4; d4; c1 ↔ ¬d1).
Proposition 1
Deciding whether a given set of commitments with ﬁxed debtor is
consistent, is ΠP2 -complete.
3.2 Relating Goals and Commitments
In this section, we investigate how an agent with a goal γ can formu-
late a corresponding commitment.
Example 5
Reconsider the context of Example 1. Let γ = d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3 ∧ d4
be a goal of agent 4. To achieve this goal, agent 4 can make the
commitment c = (4; {1, 2, 3}; d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3; d1), which intuitively
expresses that agent 4 commits to play a strategy that involves its
disarmament if agents 1, 2 and 3 do the same.
We now formalize how a commitment can be created to match a
propositional goal.
Deﬁnition 8 (Commitments Coinciding with Goal)
The set C of commitments with debtor i coincides with the goal γ of
agent i iff for every ν ∈ SN :
(ν |= γ) ⇔ ((∃c ∈ C : (ν−i |= ante(c)) ∧ (νi |= con(c)))
∧ (νi |= con({c ∈ C | ν−i |= ante(c)}))) (1)
The ‘⇒’ direction expresses that the set of commitments covers the
goal γ, i.e. for every outcome ν that satisﬁes γ, i has an active com-
mitment c corresponding to ν, which does not result in the violation
of any other commitment of i. The ‘⇐’ direction expresses that the
set of commitments is covered by the goal γ, i.e. any outcome made
possible by a commitment of i results in the satisfaction of γ.
Proposition 2
For any formula γ ∈ LΦ and agent i ∈ N , there exists a consistent
set C of commitments with debtor i that coincides with γ. Moreover,
if γ can be rewritten as a conjunction of literals, then C can be chosen
as a singleton.
It is easy to verify that some goals cannot coincide with a singleton,
e.g. the goal (d1 ↔ d2) requires two separate commitments. We
illustrate the speciﬁcation of commitments coinciding with goals in
the following example.
Example 6
Suppose that γ = (d1 ∧ d2) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ ¬d3) is a goal of agent 1.
The set C = {(1; {2, 3}; d2 ∧ d3; d1), (1; {2, 3};¬d2 ∧ ¬d3;¬d1),
(1; {2, 3}; d2 ∧ ¬d3;)} coincides with γ.
3.3 Commitments for Prioritized Goal Bases
We now relate prioritized goal bases and commitments.
Deﬁnition 9 (Commitments Guaranteeing Utility)
Let Γ = {γ1; . . . ; γp} be a prioritized goal base of i. The set C of
commitments with debtor i guarantees utility k iff for each ν ∈ SN :
ui(G, ν) ≥ k ⇐
((
νi |= con({c ∈ C | ν−i |= ante(c)})
)
∧ (∃c ∈ C : (ν−i |= ante(c)) ∧ (νi |= con(c)))) (2)
A straightforward way to construct a set of commitments that guar-
antees utility k is by constructing the set of commitments that coin-
cides with formula
∨p−kp+1
m=1 γ
m, using the construction from Propo-
sition 2. Note that for this particular choice, the ‘⇒’ direction of (2)
also holds. However, we do not require this direction in Deﬁnition 9,
due to incompatibility with Deﬁnition 10, which formalizes when an
agent’s commitments are in line with its best responses.
Deﬁnition 10 (Commitment Respecting Best Responses)
The commitment c with debtor i respects i’s best responses in G iff
for each ν ∈ SN :
(
(ν−i |= ante(c)) ∧ (νi |= con(c))
)⇒ BR(G, νi, ν−i) (3)
A set of commitments with debtor i respects i’s best responses iff
every commitment in the set does.
Example 7
Reconsider the context of Example 1. Suppose the paciﬁstic nation 4
has the goal base Γ4 = {d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3 ∧ d4;¬d4}, i.e. the ﬁrst pri-
ority of nation 4 is global disarmament, but in case this turns out to
be unachievable, it distrusts the other nations and prefers to maintain
its arms. The commitment (4; ∅;;¬d4) guarantees utility 0.5, but
does not respect 4’s best responses: if the other nations decide to dis-
arm, 4 would have been better off by disarming as well. The commit-
ment (4; {1, 2, 3}; d1∧d2∧d3; d4) guarantees utility 1 and respects
agent 4’s best responses. The pair of commitments (4; {1, 2, 3}; d1∧
d2∧d3; d4) and (4; {1, 2, 3};¬d1∨¬d2∨¬d3;¬d4) guarantees util-
ity 0.5 and respects agent 4’s best responses.
Note that a set C of commitments with debtor i which respect i’s best
responses is not necessarily consistent. Consider for instance a BG
with Γ1 = {(a1∨b1)∧a2} and δ1 = ¬(a1∧b1). Agent 1’s commit-
ments (1; 2; a2; a1) and (1; 2; a2; b1) both respect its best responses,
but are not consistent. However, we can show the following result.
Proposition 3
Let Γ = {γ1; . . . ; γp} be the goal base of some agent i. For any
k ∈ { 1
p
, . . . , p
p
} such that∨p−kp+1m=1 γm ∧ δ 
|= ⊥ there exists a non-
empty consistent set C of commitments with debtor i that guarantees
utility k and respects i’s best responses.
4 Commitment-based Deals in BGs
From a high-level point of view, many negotiation protocols are
based on agents formulating proposals or commitments, intuitively
encoding what they are prepared to offer in return for their goals be-
ing (partially) fulﬁlled. After a number of rounds, in which agents
may progressively weaken their stance, the agents may end up with a
set of mutual commitments which are such that a deal can be made.
Note that a deal does not require the involvement of all agents. For
instance, suppose two neighbouring nations 1 and 2’s ﬁrst priority it
to both disarm. In order to play the coalition strategy {d1, d2}, they
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do not need the approval of all other nations, as the action variables
involved in the deal are controlled by the agents that closed the deal.
As deals can be closed between coalitions of agents, the BG can it-
eratively be reduced based on the chosen strategies of the agents who
have already closed a deal. To formalize this, we use the notion of a
formula ϕ ∈ LΦ being conditioned by an interpretation ν of Φ′ ⊆ Φ
[13], written as cond(ϕ, ν). The formula cond(ϕ, ν) ∈ LΦ\Φ′ is ob-
tained from ϕ in the following way: for every atom p ∈ Φ′ such that
¬p ∈ ν we replace every occurrence of p in ϕ by ⊥, and for every
atom p ∈ Φ′ such that p ∈ ν we replace every occurrence of p in
ϕ by . Next, the tautologies ¬ ≡ ⊥, ¬⊥ ≡ , ( ∧ ϕ) ≡ ϕ,
( ∨ ϕ) ≡ , (⊥ ∧ ϕ) ≡ ⊥ and (⊥ ∨ ϕ) ≡ ϕ are iteratively used
to simplify the formula.
Deﬁnition 11 (Reduced BG)
Let G = (N, (Φi)i∈N , (δi)i∈N , (Γi)i∈N ), J a coalition of N and
ν ∈ SJ . The reduced BG is deﬁned as red(G, J, ν) = (N \ J,
(Φi)i∈N\J , (δi)i∈N\J , (cond(Γi, ν))i∈N\J), with cond(Γi, ν) =
{cond(γ1i , ν), . . . , cond(γpi , ν)} for i ∈ N \ J .
The next example illustrates this concept, which generalizes the no-
tion of a projection from [7].
Example 8
Reconsider the context of Example 1, i.e. the BGG with four agents.
Each agent i controls one variable, i.e. Φi = {di}. Consider the
coalition {1, 2} with the joint strategy to disarm, i.e. {d1, d2}. Then
the reduced game red(G, {1, 2}, {d1, d2}) consists of two agents
(namely agents 3 and 4), with Φ3 and Φ4 as in G. The goal bases
of agents 3 and 4 are reduced from
Γ3 = {¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d3 ∧ ¬d4; (¬d1 ∨ ¬d2 ∨ ¬d4) ∧ ¬d3}
Γ4 = {d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3 ∧ d4; d4}
to
Γ3 = {⊥;¬d4 ∧ ¬d3} Γ4 = {d3 ∧ d4; d4}
Note that in particular, agent 3 can no longer achieve utility 1.
The following results are straightforward to prove.
Proposition 4
Let G be a BG with J and J ′ two disjoint coalitions, ν ∈ SJ
and ν′ ∈ SJ′ . It holds that red(red(G, J, ν), J ′, ν′) = red(G, J ∪
J ′, (ν, ν′)).
Proposition 5
Let G be a BG, J a coalition and ν ∈ SJ . For i ∈ N \ J and
ν′ ∈ SN\J it holds that ui(G, (ν, ν′)) = ui(red(G, J, ν), ν′).
To illustrate Proposition 5, note that in Example 8 agent 4’s utility in
{d1, d2, d3, d4} in G is 1, which is the same as its utility in {d3, d4}
in the reduced game red(G, {1, 2}, {d1, d2}). The following corol-
lary follows immediately from Proposition 5.
Corollary 6
Let G be a BG, J a coalition and ν ∈ SJ . For i ∈ N \ J ,
ν′ ∈ Si and ν∗ ∈ SN\(J∪{i}) it holds that BR(G, ν′, (ν, ν∗)) ⇔
BR(red(G, J, ν), ν′, ν∗).
Intuitively, Corollary 6 expresses that the reduced game preserves
the best responses of the original game. For instance, in Exam-
ple 8 the strategy {d4} is agent 4’s unique best response to {d3}
in red(G, {1, 2}, {d1, d2}), as well as its unique best response to
{d1, d2, d3} in the original game G. As a consequence, PNEs are
also preserved.
Corollary 7
Let G be a BG with J ⊂ N , ν a strategy of J and ν′ a strategy
of N \ J . It holds that (ν, ν′) is a PNE of G iff ν′ is a PNE of
red(G, J, ν) and for every i ∈ J it holds that BR(G, νi, (ν−i, ν′)).
For instance, in Example 8 the outcome {d1, d2, d3, d4} is a
PNE of G. It also holds that {d3, d4} is a PNE of the reduced
game red(G, {1, 2}, {d1, d2}) and d1 and d2 are best responses to
{d2, d3, d4} respectively {d1, d3, d4} in G. Similarly, {d1, d2} is a
PNE of red(G, {3, 4}, {d3, d4}) and d3 and d4 are best response to
{d1, d2, d4} respectively {d1, d2, d3} in G.
Now that we have explained how deals between coalitions can be
used to reduce the BG, it remains to formalize how agents can iden-
tify these deals based on a given set of commitments.
4.1 Identifying Deals
Given a set of commitments, intuitively, a possible deal corresponds
to a coalition with a joint strategy such that all agents in the coalition
actively support the coalition strategy through their commitments.
Throughout this paper we assume that commitments are either com-
mon knowledge or known by one central entity.
Deﬁnition 12 (Possible Deal)
Let C = (Ci)i∈N be a tuple with Ci a set of commitments for every
agent i ∈ N . The coalition J and strategy ν ∈ SJ correspond to a
possible deal based on C iff:
∀i ∈ J, ∃c ∈ Ci : ((ν−i ∧ δ) |= ante(c)) ∧ (νi |= con(c)) (4)
Intuitively, Deﬁnition 12 expresses that a deal between a coalition of
agents must be backed up by an active commitment of every partici-
pating agent, i.e. no agent agrees to a deal without beneﬁting from it.
The computational complexity of the associated decision problem is
situated at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Proposition 8
Deciding whether there exists a possible deal based on a given set C
of commitments is ΣP2 -complete.
Condition (4) is obviously a necessary condition to reach an agree-
ment. However, participating in a possible deal may require the agent
to play a strategy which is incompatible with some of its other com-
mitments. Moreover, a commitment might make a deal possible, yet
not be strong enough to guarantee it. We illustrate these issues with
an example.
Example 9
Reconsider the context of Example 1 and Example 2: a BGwithN =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, Φi = {di}, δ = , Γ1 = {(¬d1 ∧ ¬d3) ∨ d2; . . .},
Γ2 = {d1 ∧ d2; . . .}, Γ3 = {¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d3 ∧ ¬d4; . . .} and
Γ4 = {d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3 ∧ d4; . . .}. Suppose the agents announce the
following commitments:
C1 = {c1 = (1; 3;¬d3;¬d1), c′1 = (1; 2; d2;)}
C2 = {c2 = (2; 1; d1; d2)}
C3 = {c3 = (3; {1, 2, 4};¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d4;¬d3)}
C4 = {c4 = (4; {1, 2, 3}; d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3; d4)}
These sets are consistent and respect each agent’s best responses.
The unique possible deal is ({1, 2}, {d1, d2}): c′1 and c2 back up
this deal. However, if agent 3 decides to bring about ¬d3, agent 1
cannot play {d1} without violating its commitment c1. Moreover,
agent 1 has not speciﬁcally committed to bring about d1 when d2 is
brought about.
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To address these issues, we introduce the notion of conﬁrmed deals.
To this end, we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of a stable set of commit-
ments, which captures the intuition of a coalition whose commit-
ments entail the willingness of all members to participate in a corre-
sponding deal, i.e. to jointly satisfy the antecedents of the commit-
ments that are part of the deal.
Deﬁnition 13 (Stable Set of Commitments)
A set of commitments C with J = deb(C) is called stable iff con(C)∧
δ |= ante(C) and C has at least one playable coalition strategy, i.e.
∃ν ∈ SJ such that ν |= con(C).
In Example 9 there are no stable sets of commitments. If agent 1 re-
places the commitment c1 with (1; {2, 3};¬d3 ∧ ¬d2;¬d1) and c′1
with c′′1 = (1; 2; d2; d1), then {c′′1 , c2} is a stable set of commitments
with {d1, d2} its unique playable coalition strategy.
As the consequent of any commitment c contains only variables of
Φdeb(c) — see Deﬁnition 6 — it follows that ν |= con(C) is equiv-
alent to νi |= con({c ∈ C | deb(c) = i}) for every i ∈ deb(C).
Therefore, one can unambiguously speak of a playable strategy of an
agent in deb(C).
Deﬁnition 14 (Conﬁrmed Deal)
Let C = (Ci)i∈N be such that each Ci only contains commitments
with debtor i and let C′ ⊆ C be a stable set of commitments with
J = deb(C′). Then J and C′ form a conﬁrmed deal based on C iff C′
has at least one safely playable coalition strategy, i.e. there is some
ν′ ∈ SJ such that ν′ |= con(C′), and for every i ∈ J and c ∈ Ci we
have
∀ν ∈ SN\J : ((ν, ν′−i) |= ante(c)) ⇒ (ν′i |= con(c)) (5)
For J = N , we drop the universal quantiﬁer and ν in (5).
Intuitively, a conﬁrmed deal guarantees for all coalition partners that
the antecedent of their commitments in C′ can be satisﬁed and that
they can at the same time honour all their commitments in C, re-
gardless of what the agents outside the coalition do. This is achieved
by playing a safely playable coalition strategy. The computational
complexity of the associated decision problem is also situated at the
second level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Proposition 9
Deciding whether there exists a conﬁrmed deal based on a given set C
of commitments is ΣP2 -complete.
It turns out that if the coalition partners have expressed consistent
commitments, having a stable set is sufﬁcient to obtain a conﬁrmed
deal.
Proposition 10
Let C = (Ci)i∈N be such that each Ci is a consistent set of commit-
ments with debtor i. If C′ ⊆ C is a stable set of commitments, then
(deb(C′), C′) is a conﬁrmed deal based on C.
Moreover, a connection can be made between stable sets and pos-
sible deals.
Proposition 11
Let C be a stable set of commitments with J = cred(C), then for
every playable coalition strategy ν ∈ SJ of C it holds that (J, ν) is
a possible deal.
Since every safely playable strategy of a conﬁrmed deal (J, C′) is in
particular a playable strategy of the stable set C′, we immediately get
the following result.
Corollary 12
Let (J, C′) be a conﬁrmed deal based on a set of commitments C,
then for every safely playable coalition strategy ν ∈ SJ of (J, C′) it
holds that (J, ν) is a possible deal.
4.2 Nash Equilibria
To illustrate how the introduced notions can be applied, we now show
that agents can choose their commitments such that the union of the
deals is a PNE (if one exists). The following results link the best
response of a debtor to the best responses of the other agents involved
in a deal.
Proposition 13
Let C be a set of commitments in the BG G such that every c ∈ C
respects the debtor’s best responses and let (J, ν) be a possible deal
based on C. For every i ∈ J and every ν′ ∈ SN\J it holds that
BR(G, νi, (ν−i, ν′)).
Intuitively, Proposition 13 expresses that every possible deal based
on commitments which respect the debtor’s best responses has the
property that, regardless of what the agents who are not part of the
deal decide to do, the agents who are part of the deal play a best
response by playing the strategy speciﬁed in the deal.
Corollary 14
Let C be a set of commitments in the BG G such that every c ∈ C re-
spects the debtor’s best responses and let (J, C′) be a conﬁrmed deal
based on C. For every i ∈ J , every safely playable coalition strategy
ν ∈ SJ and every ν′ ∈ SN\J it holds that BR(G, νi, (ν−i, ν′)).
We can now straightforwardly derive the following proposition from
Proposition 4 and Corollaries 6 and 14.
Proposition 15
Suppose that agents only announce consistent sets of commitments
respecting their best responses. If all agents are part of a conﬁrmed
deal, in either the original BG or one of its reductions based on pre-
viously closed deals, then the union of the safely playable coalition
strategies is a PNE.
Note that, by deﬁnition, no agent has an incentive to individually
deviate from an obtained deal which is a PNE. We moreover have
the following result.
Proposition 16
If the BG G has a PNE, then there exists a sequence of commitments
such that every agent is guaranteed to become part of a conﬁrmed
deal and the union of these deals is a PNE, without requiring prior
knowledge of the other agents’ goals.
Note, however, that the existence of a PNE is not required to ob-
tain a conﬁrmed deal. Consider for instance a 2 agent BG with
Φi = {di}, δi = , Γ1 = {d1 ∧ d2;¬d1 ∧ ¬d2} and Γ2 =
{¬d1∧¬d2; d1∧d2}. In other words, agent 1 prefers disarmament of
both nations over arming both nations, and vice versa for agent 2. If
the agents announce the commitments c1 = (1; 2; d2; d1) and c2 =
(2; 1;¬d1;¬d2) in the ﬁrst round, there are no possible deals. If
they additionally announce the commitments c′1 = (1; 2;¬d2;¬d1)
and c′2 = (2; 1; d1; d2) in the second round, 2 conﬁrmed deals
involving both agents are obtained, namely ({1, 2}, {c′1, c2}) and
({1, 2}, {c1, c′2}). The unique safely playable strategies are respec-
tively {¬d1,¬d2}, i.e. both nations arm, and {d1, d2}, i.e. both na-
tions disarm. These two outcomes are Pareto optimal, i.e. no other
outcome exists such that both agents would be better off.
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4.3 Commitment-based Deals in Negotiation
Protocols
The formalized concepts of commitments and commitment-based
deals can easily be plugged into existing negotiation protocols. This
allows to select protocols that best suit the needs of the application.
As an illustration, we conﬁgure two kinds of protocols.
Firstly, we explain how our notions can be used in a multilateral
monotonic concession protocol [34, 18], in which agents incremen-
tally make concessions to reach an agreement. Given our framework
of BGs with prioritized goal bases, this is a very intuitive approach
for the agents: if a commitment corresponding to the ﬁrst priority
goal of an agent does not lead to any deal, the agent can concede by
considering its second priority goal as well.
Example 10
Reconsider the context of disarmament of nations and suppose a
paciﬁstic agent 1 is in a BG with 3 agents and has the goal base
Γ1 = {d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3; d1 ∧ (d2 ∨ d3); d1}. Its ﬁrst commitment
would be c1 = (1; {2, 3}; d2 ∧ d3; d1), coinciding with its ﬁrst pri-
ority goal of global disarmament. Now assume that agents 2 and 3
have communicated commitments such that not a single possible deal
arose, e.g. c2 = (2; {1, 3};¬d1∨¬d3;¬d2) and c3 = (3; 1; d1; d3).
Then agent 1 can concede by communicating the commitment c′1 =
(1; {2, 3}; d2 ∨ d3; d1), coinciding with its second priority goal.
Concessions can thus easily be captured by opening with commit-
ments corresponding to the ﬁrst priority goal, then conceding to the
disjunction of the ﬁrst and second priority goal, next to the disjunc-
tion of the ﬁrst, second and third priority goal etc. Note that in Ex-
ample 10, the disjunction of agent 1’s ﬁrst and second priority goal
is equivalent with its second priority goal.
The notion of a conﬁrmed deal can fulﬁll the concept of agree-
ment used in the monotonic concession protocol [34, 18]. In Exam-
ple 10, the concession of agent 1 would lead to the conﬁrmed deal
({1, 3}, {c′1, c3}) based on {c′1, c2, c3}, even without concession of
agents 2 and 3. The corresponding unique safely playable coalition
strategy is {d1, d3}.
Recall that e.g. proposals corresponding to propositional formulas
would not be sufﬁcient to obtain deals between coalitions, as they do
not take the control assignment of the action variables into account.
Finally note that previous work on monotonic commitment conces-
sion does not address goal-related concession [42].
As another example, consider the negotiation protocol described
in [33], in which a broker agent matches proposals, and then notiﬁes
the agents — which submitted the proposals — about the possibility
of agreement. It is easy to see that, by using commitments as propos-
als, we can straightforwardly use our deﬁnitions of a deal to capture
the notion of matching proposals. In [33], the agents are supposed
to negotiate about which of the possible agreements is to be chosen
after they received the notiﬁcation. However, the presence of a bro-
ker agent — a central entity — can also bypass the need of this extra
negotiation by selecting at most one deal per agent. It could even use
a social criterion, e.g. by selecting the deals which involve the largest
number of agents. Whether such interventions are desirable or even
justiﬁable strongly depends on the context of the application.
5 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to study commit-
ments in BGs. Therefore, we structure this section by addressing the
related work w.r.t. BGs and commitments separately.
5.1 Related Work w.r.t. Boolean Games
Our study on opportunities for agreement and the formation of coali-
tions is reminiscent of cooperative game theory [2]. The study of
Boolean games from a cooperative point of view has led to a variety
of concepts, such as e.g. the core, stable sets of outcomes [17], efﬁ-
cient coalitions, weak and strong core [8] and stable coalitions [35].
In this existing work only BGs with a single goal are considered, yet
costs associated with strategies are used to obtain non-binary utilities.
In this paper, however, the coalition concepts, i.e. the deals, are based
on a set of commitments instead of on the BG. Nonetheless, since it
is sensible that agents’ commitments are related to their goals (see
Section 3), it is likely that, under certain assumptions, links can be
found between the different concepts. For instance, in [8] a coalition
is called efﬁcient iff it can satisfy the goal of every coalition partner,
regardless of the strategies of the agents outside the coalition. It is
clear that our concepts offer a way to obtain the efﬁcient coalitions
in the case of BGs with a single goal: if every agent communicates
commitments coinciding with their goal, the efﬁcient coalitions are
exactly the possible deals. Analogously, negotiation strategies might
be characterized such that agents obtain an agreement corresponding
to alternative solution concepts, such as the weak and strong core [8],
as these can be linked to the concept of efﬁcient coalitions. Further
investigation of these links, however, lies beyond the scope of this
paper.
Although negotiation [29, 1] and BGs [9, 17, 14, 7, 8, 41, 5] have
been widely studied, only few works have considered protocols in
BGs which allow agents to actually coordinate towards agreeable
outcomes. A multilateral negotiation protocol for BGs has been in-
vestigated in [17], where it is shown that, when the logical structure
of the goals is restricted to positive goals (i.e. no connectives other
than ∧ and ∨ are used), the protocol is guaranteed to end in a Pareto
optimal outcome, meaning that no agent can improve its position
without another agent being worse off. BGs have also been extended
to endogenous variants [39], involving a pre-play negotiation phase,
in which agents can try to inﬂuence the decisions of other agents
by means of side payments, i.e. transferring parts of their utility to
other agents. In [19], an extension of BGs is used to model voting
strategies in binary aggregation. A multilateral negotiation protocol
for BGs with prioritized goals has been developed in [15]. The pro-
tocol is driven by an agreement rule which guarantees a fair and ef-
ﬁcient outcome under complete knowledge about the other agents’
goals. It is extended to BG settings with incomplete knowledge, in
which case a weaker notion of fairness and efﬁciency is guaranteed.
In this agreement protocol, the order of the agents strongly inﬂuences
the outcome. In contrast, in this paper we introduce building blocks
for multilateral negotiation protocols in which arbitrary propositional
formulas can be used to specify goals. Moreover, the building blocks
can be used in protocols in which the ordering of the agents does not
inﬂuence the agreements, such as the multilateral protocol with the
broker agent. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the assumption of
transferable utility or knowledge about the other agents’ goals is not
required to obtain deals.
5.2 Related Work w.r.t. Commitments
Outside the setting of BGs, the characterization of commitments and
commitment-based protocols has been extensively studied [36, 25,
40, 16, 31, 32, 37, 12, 28, 22, 38]. Commitments, which can be con-
sidered a form of pre-play moves [25], are studied from a game-
theoretical perspective in Schelling’s seminal work [36]. Schelling
S. De Clercq et al. / Formalizing Commitment-Based Deals in Boolean Games 335
explains how commitments can be threats, when one commits to
deviate from its own best response to damage the opponent, or
promises, when one commits to deviate from its own best response
to cooperate with the opponent [36]. However, since we assume no
knowledge about the other agents’ goals in this paper, the agents do
not have the required information to determine whether their com-
mitments are either one of these. Instead, commitments here should
be understood primarily as a way to communicate its own incentives,
a point of view which is also noted by Schelling [36].
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of a consistent set
of commitments. A series of postulates for commitments has been
described in [37], in which the debtor and creditor are ﬁxed. Using
the monotonicity postulate, it is clear that an inconsistent set of com-
mitments with a ﬁxed debtor and creditor would violate the strong
consistency postulate. To obtain the notion of consistency as deﬁned
in our paper though, a meaningful generalization of the postulates
to variable creditors is required. In [22], conﬂicts between commit-
ments are discussed, where it is assumed that the domain dependent
conﬂict knowledge is already present. For instance, the same car can-
not be rented simultaneously by two different individuals. The frame-
work in [22] is more involved than ours, as it relies on event calculus
to formalize conﬂicts between commitments. The debtor and cred-
itor are irrelevant in the detection of conﬂicts [22]. Three different
notions of conﬂict are deﬁned, but even if we ﬁx the debtor, none
these notions coincide with our concept of consistency, as none of
them seem to take into account whether the antecedents can simulta-
neously be satisﬁed or not. In [23], the notion of feasibility of com-
mitments is introduced. The intuitive idea behind this concept is the
same as ours w.r.t consistency, i.e. checking whether it is possible
for an agent to fulﬁll a set of commitments all together [23]. Their
elaboration, however, is slightly different from ours: the feasibility
of the commitments of an agent i does not only take the commit-
ments with debtor i into account, but also those with creditor i. For
instance, if you have committed to make two payments to two differ-
ent agents but only have sufﬁcient money for one of the payments,
we consider this pair of commitments inconsistent. In [23], this set
might still be considered feasible in case there is e.g. a commitment
of a reliable agent to make a payment to you. Moreover, for a set
of commitments to be feasible there should exist an execution that
discharges them all, i.e. that brings about all the consequences [23].
Translated to our framework, that would imply that a pair of commit-
ments of the form (1; 2; d2; d1) and (1; 2;¬d2;¬d1) is not feasible.
In this paper however, this pair is consistent, due to the inconsistency
of the antecedents.
Several studies on the relationship between goals and commit-
ments can be found in the multi-agent literature [11, 38, 20]. The
variety among this work can be partially explained by the usage of
different representations for the goals. The goal models in [11] are
speciﬁed in Tropos, an agent-oriented software engineering frame-
work [10]. Goals can either be decomposed as conjunctions or as
disjunctions of subgoals. Moreover, the link between the possible
achievement of pairs of goals is formalized. In this framework, goals
are not prioritized. The authors exploit commitments for goal sup-
port and vice versa and provide elaborated semantics. In [38], goals
consists of a precondition, an in-condition, a post-condition, a suc-
cess condition and a failure condition. An agent can have multiple
goals, but it is assumed that they are mutually consistent. No priority
between goals is used. A formalization from goal to commitment and
vice versa is provided, based on guarded rules. These rules operate
on the goals (e.g. consider, activate, suspend, reactivate, drop) and
commitments (e.g. release, cancel). In [20], goals are represented in
a similar way as in [38], but the in-condition and post-condition are
dropped. The framework also involves beliefs about the other agents’
goals and capabilities. It is likely that BGs could be embedded into
this framework in case it were to be generalized to allow priorities
in the set of goals. As in [11], a notion of goal support is introduced
and the authors provide algorithms to generate commitments to sup-
port their goals [20, 27, 21]. To this end, agents also use their beliefs
about the goals of other agents to formulate commitments which are
more likely to be accepted [20]. The notion of goal support takes
all commitments into account and considers a goal to be supported
if there is a chain of commitments leading to the satisfaction of the
goal. For example, if agent 1 and 2 have communicated the commit-
ments (1; 2; d2; d1) and (2; 1; d1; d2), then none of these agents is
considered to support the goal γ = d1 ∧ d2. In contrast, we con-
sider these as commitments coinciding with γ, which moreover form
a stable set to bring about γ. Investigating the possible formal links
between the aforementioned work and ours is an interesting topic for
further research.
A large amount of the prior work on commitment-based protocols
mainly focuses on practical aspects, e.g. investigating the life-cycle
of commitments [40], solving misalignment [12], detecting excep-
tions in commitments [28], applications in a business context [16],
etc., and pays less attention to the underlying multi-agent system. In
contrast, we analyze commitment-based deals speciﬁcally in the con-
text of BGs, allowing us to exploit game-theoretical concepts such as
utility and best response to deﬁne sensible commitments and to in-
troduce suitable notions of deals between coalitions of agents.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to study, at a general level, the notion of
commitments and commitment-based deals in Boolean games. First
we have formalized the notion of commitments and explained how
goals can be related to sets of commitments. Then, we investigated
commitment-based deals, which rely on the idea of identifying sta-
ble sets among the commitments made by a group of agents. Finally,
we have illustrated how the notions of commitments and deals can
be used to guarantee e.g. the Nash property in the obtained deals, or
to conﬁgure existing negotiation protocols. The latter allows a ﬂex-
ible use of the introduced concepts: depending on the application
context one can, for instance, either plug our building blocks into a
distributed or a centralized protocol.
Note that in a practical implementation, additional aspects might
need to be addressed. However, to a large extent we can rely
on the available results w.r.t. (algebraic) formalization of commit-
ments [32, 37, 38] and commitment-based protocols [40, 31, 12]. For
instance, to escape deadlock agreements (characterized by cyclic de-
pendencies) or avoid the possibility of cheating caused by imperfect
synchrony, one could respectively rely on the 2PC protocol [40] and
the lockstep-protocol [4]. Deciding which conﬁrmed deal is closed
when more than one arises should also be addressed (e.g. choosing
the largest coalition).
Finally, an important issue is how agents can act strategically in
how they formulate commitments. This should be based on their be-
liefs about the other agents’ goals, their risk aversion and/or their
readiness to concede, and could be implemented using techniques
such as Monte Carlo tree search. Alternatively, an approach similar
to the one in [20] can be investigated, where the beliefs about the
agents’ goals are used to generate commitments that are more likely
to be accepted by other agents.
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